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Abstract
This study aims to contribute one piece to the puzzle on why industry plants
in the U.S. choose to comply with environmental laws under seemingly low
incentives i.e., few inspections and low fines. This study investigates private
enforcement, specifically citizen suits, as a possible determinant of plants’ com-
pliance behavior.
Empirically, the study focuses on compliance with the Clean Water Act
(CWA) among 1494 wastewater treatment facilities in the U.S. In a fixed eﬀects
2SLS IV model, using a ten year panel with monthly data, this study finds
that a plant that has been subject to private enforcement through a citizen
lawsuit during the past 12 months, is up to 485% less likely to be in violation
of the CWA, compared to plants that have not been sued, holding all other
variables. The marginal direct deterrence eﬀect of a citizen suit is expected to
yield a reduction of 6.24 to 14.31 violations.
The result is robust to three diﬀerent IV estimation methods (OLS, LPM
and Probit) and three diﬀerent sets of instruments. Citizen suits are instru-
mented with judicial instruments, exploiting that all citizen suits have to go
through a federal district court. Public enforcement are instrumented with
three new found instruments: EPA’s enforcement budget and two instruments
capturing the public demand for enforcement of environmental regulation.
This study’s key contribution is systematic micro-level empirical evidence on
citizen suits significant causal eﬀect in plants’ compliance behavior.
Key words: Citizen lawsuits, Enforcement, Clean Water Act, Compliance, Vi-
olation, deterrence eﬀect, EPA, environmental regulation.
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1 Introduction
Environmental pollution is a serious problem in all western countries and is of major
concern in Environmental economics. One way to limit pollution is to legislate firms’
allowed pollution levels. For such a mechanism to work, law enforcement is crucial.
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the prin-
cipal responsibility to enforce the environmental regulations. Since the 1990s, EPA’s
enforcement budget has decreased and plant inspections have significantly been re-
duced. According to the enforcement literature, one would expect decreased public
enforcement to lead to more violations of the environmental laws. This concern has
however not materialized in the U.S. An early explanation to the large compliance
rate was EPA’s changed enforcement strategy towards voluntary pollution reduction
programs and the introduction of a self-reporting system. This has later been shown
to have very limited or no impact on compliance (Delmas and Toﬀel, 2008; Innes
and Sam, 2008).
This study investigates a potential determinant of compliance that has not been
considered in previous research. Instead of focusing on public enforcement or volun-
tary compliance, this study investigates if private enforcement of the environmental
laws can explain the apparent contradiction between decreased public enforcement
and the decreasing number of violations observed in the U.S. The approach taken
is to investigate the eﬀect of private prosecution against plants in violation of the
U.S. environmental regulation. Do plants’ compliance behavior change after they
have been sued in a federal district court by a citizen lawsuit, for instance by a
non-governmental environmental group?
The working mechanism is the same as for public enforcement and and goes
back to Becker (1968) and the rational agent. Law compliance by a rational agent
is assumed to increase with the probability of conviction and the severity of the
punishment if convicted (Becker, 1968). Penalties from citizen suits are in general
larger than fines issued by EPA. This makes the expected costs for a citizen suit larger
than for public enforcement, even for a low probability of an actual suit. Furthermore,
although citizen suits are few, which decreases the perceived probability of conviction,
citizen suits come unexpectedly with only 60 days for the plant to move to compliance
before the suit goes to court, whereas EPA issues many warnings before sanctioning
a plant. This makes the expected eﬀect of an actual citizen suit larger than an
actual sanction by EPA. Citizen suits are hence expected to have a larger marginal
deterrence eﬀect than public enforcement by EPA.
The study uses data from the U.S., which is also where citizen suits are the
most common. The investigated sample period is 1990-2000, a period of time where
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public enforcement decreased and the number of citizen suits increased. The vast
majority of all citizen suits are filed for water violation, therefore this study focuses
on violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The plants chosen for investigation are
municipal wastewater treatment plants since they represent more than two-thirds of
major regulated entities under the CWA. The research questions of this study are:
Firstly, do plants change their violation behavior after they have been sued
in a federal district court by a private citizen? Secondly, how does the
potential eﬀect of a citizen suit on plants’ violation behavior compare to
the eﬀect of EPA enforcement?
Citizen Suits (CSs) have never explicitly been evaluated as a possible determinant
of plants’ compliance behavior with environmental regulation in the U.S. Two major
reasons are data scarcity and the challenge of determining causality. This study uses
a unique data set obtained from a Freedom of Act request from the US Department
of Justice, merged with data from EPAs Permit Compliance System database. To
capture the causal eﬀect of CSs on violations, CSs are instrumented with two ju-
dicial instruments, previously successfully used by Langpap and Shimshack (2010),
exploiting that all CSs have to go through a federal district court. Public enforce-
ment is instrumented with EPA’s enforcement budget and two instruments capturing
the public demand for enforcement of environmental regulation.
Evidence for a causal eﬀect of private enforcement on plants’ behavior could
partly explain why plants choose to comply under seemingly low economic incentives.
The study finds evidence for CSs to have a significant impact on plants’ violation
behavior. The result contributes an important empirical insight on a previously
unexplored aspect of environmental law enforcement in the economics literature.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a back-
ground on public enforcement, private enforcement and the expectations based on
the theoretical framework used in this study. Section 3 presents previous research on
citizen suits and known determinants of plant compliance with environmental laws.
Section 4 presents the data used in this study, the economic model explaining plant
violation, and the variables to estimate. Lastly, the chosen empirical estimation
method is presented. Section 5 presents the main results of this study, followed by a
sensitivity analysis of the results. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.
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2 Background
2.1 Public enforcement
The CWA is a federal law, for which EPA has the principal enforcement responsibility.
In practice, the majority of the enforcement (monitoring, inspections and sanctions)
are delegated to state agencies where the facilities are located. The state agencies
also issue the emission permits. Although EPA and the states share the enforcement
responsibility, EPA still retains the right to take direct action where it believes that
a state has failed to enforce the law. A state can also request EPA involvement in
case it needs support (Bearden et al, 2011).
According to EPA’s guidelines for enforcement, local state agencies are recom-
mended to inspect all plants in the state at least once every two years for large plants
and somewhat less often for smaller plants. An inspection can be long and detailed
or a short visit, depending on the plant’s compliance history and plant specific char-
acteristics such as abatement technology (USEPA, 2007). Longer inspections are
very costly for the plant since it requires planning and since staﬀ are taken out of
production. When a plant is found in non-compliance, EPA (or the state agency)
will issue warnings to the plant in the form of phone calls and letters of notice. If
the plant chooses to stay in violation, the plant may be fined during an inspection
visit or sanctioned by the administrative law judges.1
For very serious violations of the CWA, the legal case can be determined by
the federal Department of Justice for civil prosecution. EPA’s guidelines however,
give strong preference to prosecuting non-compliance in the administrative court
over civil and criminal referrals. The reason is that the administrative court sets
the lowest possible fine needed to push the plant into compliance, whereas the fines
determined in the federal district court don’t consider such circumstances and are
higher in general. Furthermore, prosecuting in a federal district court is more costly
for all parties involved (Grey and Shimshack, 2011). Because civil court prosecution
for public enforcement is very rare, it will be treated as negligible in this study.
EPA (and the local state agencies) have approximately seven thousand facilities
to monitor under the CWA, and about forty-one million facilities in total under all
environmental regulations (Grey and Shimshack, 2011). Due to limited resources,
and because monitoring and sanctions are costly, state agencies will solve the maxi-
mization problem with respect to the number of firms in compliance subject to their
1Factors determining the magnitude of the fine include: history of compliance, duration of
non-compliance, economic benefit for the plant of non-compliance, harm to human health and
environment, the plant’s ability to pay a fine, fairness and consistency as well as discretionary
adjustments (USEPA 2001).
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budget constraint. Hence, monitoring will not be complete and all violations will
not lead to sanctions. Both the number of inspections and sanctions vary between
states and over time (Russel, 1990; Naysnerski and Tietenberg, 1992 and Percival
and Schroeder, 2006).
In the beginning of the 1980s, the international environmental law enforcement
policy community started to advocate for more voluntary pollution reduction pro-
grams and information policies and less conventional enforcement, such as plant
inspections and sanctions (Mintz, 2012). The idea was that law enforcement could
be made more cost-eﬀective than conventional enforcement. Harrington (1988) sug-
gests that the optimal enforcement strategy would be to enforce only ”low cooperate”
(violating) plants, and relieve the ”high cooperate” plants from expensive inspections
and monitoring. This enforcement strategy would give plants additional incentives
to choose compliance. The United States followed this new trend, and the U.S. EPA
started to reduce its traditional enforcement activities in the 1990s, and redirected
towards information policies. Between 1990-1996, plant inspections were reduced by
approximately 25% and the enforcement budget was reduced by approximately 15%
(Gray and Shimshack, 2011). However, voluntary adaption of abatement technology
and voluntary reduced emissions have shown to have very little or no eﬀect on com-
pliance in the U.S. (May, 2005 and Delmas and Toﬀel, 2008), and cannot explain the
decreasing number of violations during the period.
To summarize, EPA has the principal responsibility to enforce the environmental
regulations in the U.S. Due to constrained enforcement budget and enforcement being
costly, public enforcement is never complete. Furthermore, public enforcement has
decreased since the 1980s in favor of voluntary programs, which have been shown to
have small or no eﬀect on compliance.
2.2 Private enforcement
As mentioned in Section 2.1, plants in violation of the CWAmay not be sanctioned by
EPA or the state agency in charge. In 1972, the U.S. opened up for private actors to
help enforce the environmental laws. The Clean Air Act (CAA)2 was the first federal
environmental statute to include provisions for citizen enforcement, followed by the
CWA the same year3. In 1976, also the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)4 followed and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
242 U.S.C. §7401 et seq.
333 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.
442 U.S.C. §6901 et seq.
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and Liability Act (CERCLA, sometime referred to as the Superfund)5 in 1980. Since
then, private enforcement has become a natural part of the law enforcement in the
U.S. Today, all major federal environmental laws6 support citizen lawsuits. Since
the introduction of CSs in 1972, an increasing trend of CSs is observed until the mid
1990s, where the number of CSs are stabilized with a fluctuation around 90 CSs per
year, see Figure 1.
Figure 1: Development of citizen suits during 1970-2002
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Note: the graph includes all citizen suits in the U.S during the period 1970-2002. The number of
acts providing for citizen suits increases with time. The first three years include only the CAA and
the CWA, whereas all acts are included from 1980 and onwards. The data are from May (2003).
Citizen suits are the most common in the United States but also exist in other
countries. Also Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Colombia, Argentina and India
provide a possibility of citizen suits.7 Although in India, especially one person called
M.C. Mehta has been very successful in civil suits, lawsuits by private citizens or
542 U.S.C. §9601 et seq.
6CAA, CWA, CERCLA, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Safe Drinking
Water Act.
7A diﬀerent version of citizen suits exists in the EU environmental law. Such a citizen suit
can only be directed against a public enforcement authority that has failed to fulfill its duty, and
thus not the violating agent directly. Citizen suits in the EU require less proof burden due to the
”precautionary principle” in EU environmental law (McIntyre and Modedale, 1997).
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environmental organizations are few compared to in the United States. Therefore
it’s reasonable to do this study on U.S. data.
Individuals may bring a CS in a U.S. district court against persons8 who violate
a prescribed eﬄuent standard or limitation, often a person responsible for a facility.
To initiate a CS, the plaintiﬀ has to send a written notice to the polluter (and to
the public enforcement agency). The person/plant then has 60-90 days to rectify the
violation and move to compliance. In case the plant is still in violation of the act,
the suit will come into force and be determined in a federal district court. If the CS
is successful, the violator will have to pay substantial fines to the US treasury and
may also be bound to comply with costly action-based consent (Smith, 2004).
Pursuing a lawsuit is expensive and requires judicial knowledge. Therefore most
civil lawsuits come from large environmental groups, that have lawyers and the fi-
nancial resources to take action.9 Because the losing party pays the legal expenses,
the prospects of conviction in court is crucial for the environmental group (Baik
and Shogren, 1993). Also visibility is important; the environmental groups are more
likely to initiate a lawsuit if a court case can give the organization publicity which
leads to new members and donations (Langpap and Shimshack, 2010).
A CS works through the same mechanisms as public enforcement, i.e., it’s costly
for a plant to be targeted under non-compliance. But CSs also diﬀer from public
enforcement in several respects. Firstly, all CSs have to go through a federal district
court whereas court cases initiated by EPA go through the administrative court.
Penalties determined in the federal district courts are in general larger than penalties
issued by the administrative court (Gray and Shimshack, 2011). Secondly, whereas
public enforcement is relatively predictable — inspections are planned and many
warnings are issued in case of a violation — a CS comes unexpectedly with only
one formal warning before the case goes to court. This makes an actual citizen
lawsuit very eﬀective and the marginal eﬀect of such a lawsuit is expected to be
much larger than a fine issued by the administrative court. Thirdly, CSs crowd in
public monitoring (Langpap and Shimshack, 2010), which makes citizen lawsuits
forceful in double respect.
8Although unusual, individuals may also bring a citizen suit against EPA (or the state agency
in charge) if EPA fails to carry out a non-discretionary duty under the law.
9Large environmental groups are organizations such asBaykeepers orRiverkeepers. The groups
Earthjustice and the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic are both specialized on CSs.
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2.3 Theoretical expectations
Becker’s (1968)10 hypothesis, that law compliance increases with the probability of
conviction and the severity of the punishment if convicted, is well established both
theoretically and empirically in the environmental law enforcement literature.11 As-
suming rational compliance behavior, a possible explanation for the increased com-
pliance would be lower abatement costs which would make it more profitable to
choose compliance. But lower abatement costs require investments in costly abate-
ment technology, which is not expected to be adopted under low economic incentives.
The discrepancy between economic theory about the rational agent and the decreas-
ing number of violations, indicates that there are more costs associated with non-
compliance to the environmental regulations in the United States, than previously
investigated. Such costs may come from private enforcement.
CSs are expected to increase plants’ cost of non-compliance substantially. Firstly
because it’s costly to be a defendant in a lawsuit and the lawsuit may lead to a
fine. Secondly, the additional dimensions of CSs being less predictable, the fines
being larger, CSs crowding in public monitoring, and because the plant’s reputation
may be damaged, make CSs likely to have a stronger impact on plants’ compliance
behavior than regular public enforcement would.
In the public enforcement literature, a general finding is that public enforcement
towards a given plant has a positive eﬀect on that plant’s probability to choose com-
pliance with environmental regulation. This eﬀect is often referred to as ”specific
deterrence” or ”direct eﬀect”. In addition to direct eﬀects, ”general deterrence”, or
”indirect deterrence” eﬀects refer to the eﬀect on a given plant’s compliance behavior
as a function of law enforcement at other plants. Public enforcement consists mainly
of inspections, sanctions and fines, whereof inspections coupled with substantial fines
are found to have the strongest direct and indirect eﬀect on violations. Specific de-
terrence eﬀects are expected to be eﬀective after a plant has been sued and some
time ahead. Because CSs work through the same mechanisms as public enforcement,
theoretically we expect CSs to have both a direct and an indirect deterrence eﬀect
on plants’ compliance behavior. In practice however, CSs are few12 and therefore
the data contain too little variation for CSs per state and year to test such a hy-
pothesis. Hence, general deterrence of CSs is not included in this study as a possible
10See also Stigler, 1970 and Estlund and Wachter, 2013.
11For adaptations of Becker’s model to environmental context, see for instance Sutinen and
Anderson (1985) and Russell et al (1986). For empirical findings see for instance Magat and Viscusi
(1990), Polinsky and Shavell (2000), Kagan et al (2003) and Deily and Gray (2007).
12In the sample investigated in this study, the average number of CSs per state and year is only
0.34.
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determinant of CSs on plants’ violation behavior.
This study doesn’t investigate the eﬀect of citizen suits’ existence, only the be-
havior change in case a plant has been sued. Similarly, the possible compliance status
change when a plant in violation receives a warning letter about a citizen lawsuit
isn’t considered. It’s possible that not all warnings lead all the way to prosecution in
court. To not consider this eﬀect only has implications for the estimated results in
case the plants that choose compliance after a warning, are not representative for all
plants that receive a warning. One may expect larger plants to have more diﬃculties
to adjust the pollution levels due to large production, than smaller plants. On the
other hand, smaller plants may have less advanced abatement technology and may
have diﬃculties to reduce production due to smaller margins. Either way, all equa-
tions will control for plant size. If there are other variables, however, which make
some plants stay in violation after a warning, the estimated results would be biased.
Although no such a bias is expected theoretically, the bias is unexplored.
A final theoretical expectation is that both private enforcement and public en-
forcement are reversely correlated with violations because known violators are ex-
pected to receive more enforcement. Estimating enforcement on compliance without
considering endogeneity would result in a biased and inconsistent model capturing the
correlation and not the causal eﬀect, which may, if the reverse causality is stronger
than the causal eﬀect of interest, result in a negative coeﬃcient and lead to the
interpretation that more enforcement leads to more violations. However, disentan-
gling causality may be possible by identifying factors that aﬀect private enforcement
and public enforcement but do not directly influence plants’ decision to violate the
CWA. Therefore, appropriate instruments might include the factors that influence
citizen groups’ perceived chances of lawsuit success or private enforcement costs, and
for public enforcement, EPA’s economic ability to enforce the CWA and the public
pressure in the state for enforcement.
This study aims to find if plants change their violation behavior after a CS. In
an attempt to disentangle causality and correlation, this study is done as an Instru-
mental Variable (IV) analysis, instrumenting citizen suits following Langpap and
Shimshack (2010), and introducing three novel instruments for public enforcement.
3 Previous literature
Previous literature on CS eﬀects is very sparse, and even more absent for eﬀects on
plant compliance with environmental laws. The topic of CSs is diﬃcult to address
for mainly two reasons: data availability, both for citizen suits and plant level (EPA)
state enforcement, and the diﬃculty of determining the causal impact of CSs on
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compliance, mentioned above.
The topic of citizen suits is mainly investigated in the law literature where the
law process of a CS, the development over time and possible future direction of CSs
are assessed. For instance, Tyson (2014) discussed future possible collaboration be-
tween citizen suits’ initiators and EPA. In economics, the literature has primarily
focused on the eﬃciency of citizen suits.13 Fadil (1985) argues for the social bene-
fits of developing citizen suits where public enforcement is limited and market-based
pollution-taxes are not a possibility. Heyes (1997) discusses the optimal tax or sub-
sidy which would make citizen suits eﬃcient.
Langpap and Shimshack (2010) investigate the eﬀect of CSs on public enforce-
ment. They obtained data on CSs from a Freedom of Information Action (FOIA).
To account for endogeneity, they instrument CSs with judicial variables. They find
that CSs crowd in public monitoring but crowd out public sanctions (Langpap and
Shimshack, 2010).
Thus, previous research on private enforcement is limited, and no previous re-
search exists on citizen suits direct eﬀect on plants’ violation behavior. The existing
literature on plants’ compliance behavior with environmental regulation has focused
primarily on the relationship between public enforcement and compliance. A gen-
eral finding is that voluntarily pollution reductions are rare, and that direct as well
as indirect enforcement increases plants’ probability to choose compliance with en-
vironmental regulation. Some examples of these findings will be more thoroughly
discussed in what follows.
Vidovic and Khanna (2007) identify the new EPA enforcement strategy as the
main explanation for the reduced number of violations in the U.S., and Sam (2010)
finds that voluntary programs launched by EPA decreased violations in three indus-
tries, while it increased violations in two others. Also the participation rate in the
voluntary programs has sometimes been emphasized as a success. However, accord-
ing to the critics, firms that participated in the programs are found to the be the
same firms that already had made large pollution reductions before the programs
were launched. The observed eﬀects are simply a continuation of the time trend
that had started before the programs (Arora and Cason 1995 and 1996; Khanna
and Damon 1999; Gamper-Rabindran 2006; Innes and Sam 2008). Innes and Sam
(2008) find that plants are only motivated by voluntary programs if the programs are
coupled with relaxed enforcement, which supports Harrington’s argument of optimal
enforcement. But since the incentive to cooperate disappears as soon as enforcement
is reduced, the strategy is inoperative. Therefore, Innes and Sam (2008) conclude
13See for instance Naysnerski and Tietenberg (1992), Baik and Shogren (1994), and Heyes and
Rickman (1999).
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voluntarily programs to be complements rather than substitutes to traditional en-
forcement, in an optimal enforcement strategy. In addition, as also Harrington (1988)
himself points out, his theory assumes that the individual plant knows to which group
it’s assigned at any given time, and that EPA knows the plant’s likelihood to viola-
tive an environmental law, which requires information about every plant’s abatement
costs (Harrington, 1988). These are assumptions that are not likely to hold in reality.
Instead, legal regulation accompanied by substantial enforcement including mon-
etary fines are what have been found to really aﬀect plants to choose compliance.14
Magat and Viscusi (1990) investigate the direct deterrence eﬀects of EPA inspec-
tions on compliance with the CWA in the pulp and paper industry. They find that
a given facility’s probability to violate the law is about twice as high if the facility
has not been inspected in the previous quarter. Deily and Gray (2007) also examine
direct deterrence eﬀects of enforcement on compliance. In a study on 41 large steel
mill plants in the U.S. between 1976 and 1989, they find that the probability that
a plant would comply with the environmental law is about 33% higher if the plant
has been inspected during the past two years, compared to a plant that has not been
inspected. Their study also shows that firms with fewer violations received in general
fewer inspections (Deily and Gray, 2007). Earnhart (2004a; 2004b) finds that en-
forcement actions on a given plant has a positive eﬀect on compliance for that plant,
and that monetary fines has the greatest eﬀect. Indirect deterrence is shown to be
nearly as strong for a given plant, as if the given plant is enforced directly. Monetary
fine amounts are shown to have a strong indirect deterrence eﬀect (Shimshack and
Ward, 2005). Gray and Shadbegian (2007) investigate indirect deterrence further
and find that the deterrence eﬀect is limited to the state. These empirical findings
illuminate two major empirical insights — public enforcement matters (through both
specific and general deterrence) and reverse causality exists between public enforce-
ment and compliance: public enforcement aﬀects compliance behavior and violations
attract more enforcement.
Gray and Shadbegian (2005) investigate whether plant characteristics can explain
why some plants choose to comply whereas other plants choose not to. They use
plant-level compliance data together with data on plant characteristics on pulp and
paper mill plants in the U.S for the period 1979-1990. They find that plant char-
acteristics are not significant determinants of compliance in general, however large
and old plants tend to comply less with the environmental regulations (Gray and
Shadbegian, 2005).
As already pointed out, reverse causality is a major issue when estimating the
14See for instance Magaat and Viscusi (1990), Doonan, Lanoie, and LaPlante (2005), Gray and
Schadbegian (2005) and Shimshack and Ward (2005).
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eﬀect of enforcement on compliance.15 Finding instruments for public enforcement is
however diﬃcult, and previous studies use diﬀerent approaches to capture the causal
eﬀect. The dominant approach so far is to predict public enforcement in a first stage
probability model.16 In an attempt to make compliance exogenous to the model,
Magat and Viscusi (1990) model the probability of compliance in a first step using
past pollution, past inspections and plant and region specific characteristics. Using
lags makes sense since it’s not likely that today’s compliance can aﬀect monitoring
that has already occurred. But as Gray and Shimshack (2011) point out, compliance
decisions by the plant may be constant over time. If that’s the case, then today’s
observations may be correlated with past observations and thus, reverse causality is
still present in the model. Gray and Deily (1996) estimate compliance as a function
of plant and local characteristics, and public enforcement as a function of plant
characteristics. They obtain two equations from which they model the relationship
between compliance and public enforcement in both directions, and find that public
enforcement encourages more compliance, but also that more compliance generates
less public enforcement.
To conclude, according to previous literature, conventional enforcement with
”teeth” such as sanctions, including more monitoring and substantial fines, has the
strongest reduction impact on violations. Both direct and indirect deterrence eﬀects
exist for public enforcement. Also plant specific eﬀects, such as plant size, explain
plants’ compliance behavior. Public enforcement and private enforcement are simul-
taneously determined and public enforcement and compliance are causally connected
in both directions. Still, there is no answer to why plants choose to comply also in
the absence of strong public enforcement. No previous literature has investigated
CSs as a possible determinant for this choice.
This study relates to previous research showing that, firstly, citizen suits are pow-
erful; for instance CSs aﬀect EPA enforcement (Langpap and Shimshack, 2010). Sec-
ondly, all cost-increasing enforcement should lead to increased incentives for plants
to comply with environmental laws (Becker, 1968). By investigating citizen suits as
a possible determinant of plants’ violation behavior, this study contributes to the
environmental economics literature on environmental law enforcement.
15For empirical evidence on reverse causality for public enforcement, see for instance Carson
(1970), Bardach and Kagan (1982), Fenn and Veljanovski (1988) and Gray and Deily (1996).
16See for instance: Laplante and Rilstone (1996); Earnhart (2004a, 2004b); Staﬀord (2002, 2003);
Sigman (2009) and Shimshack and Ward (2005, 2008).
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4 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy of this study is to identify a consistent regression model, from
which conclusions can be made about the citizen suits’ impact on plants’ violation
behavior. In an attempt to capture the causal impact of CSs and public enforcement
on violations, an IV-approach is taken. CS are instrumented with judicial instru-
ments exploiting that CSs go through a diﬀerent court than lawsuits initiated by
EPA. Public enforcement are instrumented with EPA’s enforcement budget and two
instruments capturing the public demand for enforcement of environmental regu-
lation. The endogenous variables are predicted using the instruments and all other
explanatory variables in first stage equations (one equation per endogenous variable).
The predicted variables are then included in a second stage equation including all
other explanatory variables, from which the main results are interpreted. The data
set covers the period 1990-2000 and consists mainly of monthly EPA/state enforce-
ment data including plant inspections, sanctions and fines, merged with plant level
data on citizen suits.
This section begins with an assessment of the data sample. The next step is then
to identify an economic model explaining plants’ violation behavior, assuming eco-
nomic rational behavior among plants. Then follows an assessment of the economic
model from an econometric point of view, including the issue of endogeneity, followed
by the empirical model specification and the estimation methods.
4.1 Data
The plant level data include: citizen suits and judicial instruments, public enforce-
ment including plant inspections and monetary fines, violations and plant size. The
citizen suit litigation data, including judicial instruments, is from the US Department
of Justice, and the public enforcement data is from the EPAs Permit Compliance
System.17 Public enforcement instruments, county level GDP per capita, state in-
come tax and EPA enforcement budget, are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Census Bureau’s data base and EPA’s web page, respectively. Control variables are
discussed in Section 4.3. The data set consists of 1494 plants, with 197208 unique
plant level observations.
Since the vast majority of all CSs are filed for water violation, this study focuses
on CWA violations. A violation is defined as exceeding the permitted level of Biologi-
cal Oxygen Demand (BOD). BOD is a good general pollution indicator because BOD
17The data were used in (Langpap and Shimshack, 2010), which focused on whether private
citizen suits and public enforcement are substitutes or complements.
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also comes with a certain proportion of other pollutants. It’s also the standard mea-
sure of the organic pollutant content of water (Magat and Viscusi, 1990). This study
focuses on all the ”major”18 municipal wastewater treatment plants in the U.S that
report conventional water pollution discharges to the regulator in the fifteen states
where the plants are located.19 The states included in the sample are approximately
evenly distributed among Democratic and Republican state governments.
Data on compliance with the CWA are in general based on the plants’ own reports
of their emission levels. Compliance data from small plants, with limited resources
to install monitoring technology, are based solely on inspections. According to Gray
and Shimshack (2011), it’s considered standard to trust the self-reported data due
to the harsh punishment for mis-reporting. This study will follow this standard.
The general plant behavior is to comply with the CWA. On average, a plant
is in violation 0.3 times per year and only 3.9% of all plant level observations are
violations. For data analysis, this implies small variation in the data which may
create diﬃculties to perform some statistical tests. The number of violations decrease
over the sample period, see Figure 2.
Figure 2: Total number of violations per year during the sample period 1990-2000
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Note: The vertical axis is truncated.
18The term ”major” is EPA’s own term and includes all municipal wastewater treatment plants
that discharge at least 1 million gallons per day, cause a significant impact on the receiving water
body, or serve a population of at least 10,000.
19The fifteen states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Mississippi, North Carolina, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and West
Virginia.
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On average, plants are inspected 1.5 times per year and fined 0.04 times per year.
A fine is on average approximately $11,000. As shown in Figure 3, both the rate of
EPA inspections and the magnitude of monetary fines issued by EPA, decrease during
the period, whereas CSs increase during the period, neither of which monotonically.20
In 1990, only one wastewater treatment plant was sued by a citizen for violating the
CWA. The number of CSs peaked in 1996, with 19 sued plants.
Figure 3: General trends for the number of citizen suits, number of EPA inspections
and the magnitude of EPA fines issued in case of violation.
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Table 1 shows the main variables in this study, presented in numbers.
Table 1: Enforcement Descriptive Statistics: 1990-2000
Number of instances
Plants 1494
States 15
Inspections 23,944
Public fines 684
Citizen lawsuits in federal courts 54
Violation of the CWA 6094
20In both Figures 4(a) and 4(b), a direction turn in the data is shown in 1996. This is in agreement
with the findings in Langpap and Shimshack (2010), that citizen suits and the EPA monitoring are
complements.
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4.2 Economic model
In the economic model, plants’ compliance behavior is a function of several factors:
violationit = f(CS it, public enforcement it, Xβit), (1)
where CS is self-explanatory, public enforcement includes plant inspections and sanc-
tions (in case of violation), and Xβ stands for all other explanatory control variables
such as plants’ abatement technologies, abatement costs and plant size. The sub-
scripts indicate plant i at time t.
Plants’ abatement technology and abatement costs are however unobservable and
therefore not possible to include in the empirical model. Together the unobserved
variables that aﬀect a plant’s violation behavior form an error term. A second
obstacle with the economic model (Equation 1) is that some of the explanatory
variables are expected to be endogenously determined with the dependent variable
violations. For an overview of which variables are expected to be endogenous to the
model, see Table 2. The expected signs in the table refer to the expected causal
impact of the variable, and not the correlation between the variables.
Table 2: The expected causal impact of the variables aﬀecting plant violations.
Variable Expected sign Endogenous
Direct deterrence variables:
Citizen suits against plant i − yes
Inspections of plant i by EPA/state − yes
Plant i fined by EPA/state − yes
Indirect deterrence variables:
Other plants inspected by EPA − no
Other plant fined by EPA − no
Additional control variable:
Plant size + no
Both CSs and public enforcement are expected to aﬀect violations negatively,
since all enforcement increases the cost of non-compliance. At the same time, both
environmental groups and the state agency are likely to monitor previous violators
more than plants with a history of compliance. Plants that have a history of viola-
tions are also issued larger fines in case a state agency finds the plant in violation
again, since the last fine was not large enough to push the plant into compliance.21
21For more factors determining the magnitude of the fine, see Section 2.1.
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Therefore, the three first variables in Table 2 are expected to be reversely correlated
with violations.
The general deterrence variables (other plants sanctioned and fined) are expected
to be exogenous to the model, because enforcement of one plant is not based on other
plants’ violation status.22
Plant size is expected to increase plants’ likelihood to be in violation because
larger plants emit more pollution. The variable is not expected to be endogenously
determined with compliance status since plant size is fairly stable over time.
4.3 Variables in the empirical model
The primary goal of this study is to examine the eﬀect of a citizen suit on plants’ vio-
lation behavior, specifically, if a given plant’s likelihood to violate the CWA changes
after the plant has been sued in a citizen lawsuit. The dependent variable in each
of the main model regressions is the violations of the CWA. The dependent variable
may be a count variable: the integer number of violations by a given plant during
the past 12 months, or a dummy variable which equals one if the given plant is in vi-
olation at any time during the past 12 months, and zero otherwise. An IV-approach
is used to overcome the endogeneity issues of citizen suits and public enforcement.
4.3.1 A short note on valid instruments
A valid instrument has to be relevant ; being able to significantly explain variation
in the instrumented variable. For the main model to be consistent, the instrument
also has to pass the exclusion restriction; it has to be exogenous to the main model,
i.e., not correlate with the error term in the main equation, and it can only aﬀect
the dependent variable in the main model through the endogenous variable, never
directly. While relevance and direct correlation can be tested, exogeneity cannot.
Instead, economic theory and logical reasoning become crucial. Because all unob-
served variables aﬀecting plants’ compliance behavior are captured in the error term,
the instruments cannot be correlated with any of the unobserved variables.
The omitted (unobserved) variables are presented below, followed by the intuition
of the chosen instruments and the motivation why the instruments are exogenous to
the main model. All instruments included in this study meet the relevance criterion
and are only significant in the main model through the instrumented variables.
22The enforcement budget is flexible within its constraints, therefore CWA violations are not as-
sumed to be substitutes, although trade-oﬀs between plant enforcement are made on an aggregated
national level due to fixed national enforcement budget.
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4.3.2 Omitted variables
Recalling previous literature in Section 3 and data availability in Section 4.1, un-
observed plant characteristics aﬀecting plants’ compliance behavior may be: plant’s
abatement technology, abatement costs and plant age. Other omitted variables may
be plant governance and productivity, which in turn may be explained by: price of
water, local infrastructure and geographical factors. These latter variables are to a
large extent captured by state dummies and seasonal dummies, see Section 4.3.5,
and are therefore not part of the error term.
4.3.3 Direct deterrence variables
As concluded in Section 4.2, all direct deterrence variables are endogenous to the
model and have to be instrumented in order to estimate a consistent regression
model. For citizen suits, this study follows Langpap and Shimshack (2010) and in-
struments citizen suits with judicial instruments. The chosen instruments for both
public enforcement variables (inspections and fines) are not used in previous litera-
ture and are an important contribution of this study. Together with the instruments
of CSs, the new public enforcement instruments allow for an empirical investigation
of the causal eﬀect of citizen suits on plants’ violation behavior.
Instruments for Citizen lawsuits Whether an environmental group will sue
a plant depends on the costs associated with prosecution and the probability of
conviction. The two following instruments capture both these factors, exploiting the
fact that all civil lawsuits have to go through the federal district courts.23
The GHP scores (named after its originators: Giles, Hettinger and Peppers) pro-
vide a measure of the ideological preferences of judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals
in a given district and year, on a liberal-conservative scale. The intuition is that
conservative judges tend to vote in favor for the sued plant whereas less conservative
judges tend to vote for the environment’s best. The preferences are converted to
scores on a scale of ideology which goes from negative one to positive one, where the
latter (former) is the most (least) conservative, following Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
and Poole’s (1998) estimation method.24 The GHP score is based on the appointing
US President and the ideology scores of the US senators from the state in which the
court is located. In case the US senators and the appointing President’s political
party aﬃliation diﬀer, the GHP score is equivalent to the appointing President’s
23This is unlike public lawsuits which are generally handled in the administrative court.
24The GHP scores used in this study are estimated by Langpap and Shimshack (2010).
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score.25 As Langpap and Shimshack (2010) point out, this instrument recognizes
the important role of senators in the judicial appointment process when senatorial
courtesy is present. Since more liberal court/year combinations have lower GHP
score than more conservative, the victory probabilities may be perceived as lower for
higher GHP scores, and thus the GHP score is expected to have a negative impact
on the number of CSs at a given time.
The second instrument is the average caseload per judge in a given district court
in a given time period. A higher caseload implies longer processing time in court
and in turn, a more costly process as well as longer time for which the suer’s money
is locked into the prosecution process, i.e., a higher caseload per judge increases the
plaintiﬀ’s opportunity costs. Therefore higher caseload is expected to have a negative
eﬀect on civil lawsuits.26
To conclude, the two judicial instruments capture the probability to succeed with
a citizen suit in court, and the cost for the suer to prosecute — both of which two
essential factors for the environmental group in the decision whether it will pursue a
lawsuit. Since the two instruments are derived from political climate, no correlation
between them and the omitted variables mentioned in Section 4.3.2 is expected, and
hence the instruments are expected to be exogenous to the main model.
Instruments for Inspections by EPA or state agency Two instruments
for inspections are found. The first instrument for inspections is the EPA pollution
enforcement budget. According to EPA’s own guideline, all plants should receive
an inspection at least every second year, more often if possible. Because they are
labor intensive, inspections are costly and make a substantial share of the enforce-
ment budget. The EPA budget devoted to enforcing environmental regulations of
pollution is therefore a crucial determinant for how many inspections can be made
in a given state. Hence, inspections are expected to increase with the EPA pollution
enforcement budget. The budget is on federal level, whereas omitted variables are
local factors. Therefore no correlation is expected between the budget variable and
the unobserved omitted variables. To avoid feed-back eﬀects between the EPA bud-
get and violations, the budget variable is yearly. This way, any temporary regional
changes in number of violations will not directly aﬀect the budget variable. In case
of a national trend change in the number of violations, the causality is ensured with
a 12 months lag of the budget variable. Inspections are expected to increase with
the EPA budget.
25Previous literature links appointing politicians to federal judges’ behavior (Lyles, 1996 and
Pinello, 1999).
26The caseload variable used in this study is estimated by Langpap and Shimshack (2010).
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The second instrument for inspections is the General tax rate of private income
in the state where the plant is located. The intuition is twofold. Firstly, a higher
tax rate indicates a stronger public demand for governmental services, including
enforcement of the CWA.27 Secondly, a higher tax rate generates more revenue to
the local government, enabling more inspections. One may also consider the share
of democrats in the local government as a proxy for public demand of enforcement
for environmental laws. In this study, the tax rate is preferable over the share of
democrats because the variable is continuous and therefore carries more variation.
Recalling that the omitted variables are plant specific characteristics, there are very
few reasons to expect the income state tax rate to be directly correlated with the
main model’s error term. The tax rate variable is lagged 12 months, because the
money used for inspections come from last years’ tax revenue.
Instrument for Fines issued by the EPA or state agency Instrumenting
the magnitude of fines issued by the EPA is challenging, since to a large extent the
fine is determined by the plant’s violation history and ability to pay the fine.28
Ability to pay a fine is likely to be correlated with other plant specific characteristics
for the plant, and therefore the instrument cannot be plant specific in order to pass
the exogeneity criterion. A natural approach would be to predict today’s fine by
previous fines. This modeling approach is however unsatisfactory as a plant’s ability
to pay often is constant over time, and thus endogeneity would remain in the model.
Sanctioning a plant or issuing a fine is costly for the state agency because it’s
labor intensive and may also be time consuming to determine the fine amount for
the specific plant. Sanctioning a plant may also be unpopular among local citi-
zens if the sanction leads to local unemployment. Therefore, further enforcement
in case of violations needs local support (or pressure). Assuming that environment
health is a normal good, the demand for cleaner environment should increase as
income rises in a developed country29 and therefore, income per capita is expected
to be positively correlated with the fines issued against plants in violation of the
CWA. The income per capita where the plant is located is used as an instrument for
fine. Income per capita is not likely to correlate with any of the possible omitted
variables such as abatement technology and local industry governance of the plant,
because the omitted variables are mainly plant characteristics whereas income level
is derived from variables such as innovations and international trade, and short run
27There is a common view that, for low income tax states, other values may be given priority
over the environment, such as protecting the free market and the ”personal freedom”.
28See section 2.1 for a full description on how the magnitude of the fine is determined.
29This reasoning doesn’t refer to a certain level of GDP or the Environmental Kuznet Curve.
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fluctuations depends on factors such as employment rate and the business cycle state.
4.3.4 Indirect deterrence variables
We know from previous literature that general deterrence, or indirect enforcement,
is almost as eﬀective as direct enforcement when it comes to influencing plants’
compliance behavior to environmental regulation.
CS of other plants in the state where the plant is located As mentioned
in the introduction, an indirect deterrence eﬀect of CSs is theoretically expected.
Because the number of CSs is small, the data don’t allow for such an empirical
investigation. For the same reason, the eﬀect of neglecting the variable is expected
to be very small.
Public enforcement of other plants in the state where the plant is lo-
cated Two indirect deterrence variables are included in the model: sanctions of
other plant during the past 12 months in the state where the plant is located and
total amount of fines during the past 12 months of other plants. The variables are
expected to be exogenous to the model because states do not typically have fixed
budgets specifically for water enforcement and monitoring, but rather for environ-
mental monitoring as a whole (Langpap and Shimshack, 2010). Thus, there is no
direct plant level trade-oﬀ expected — public enforcement of one wastewater facility
is not dependent on public enforcement of another. The data also show significant
variation in public monitoring and enforcement levels across both time and space.
4.3.5 Additional control variables
Plant size As learned from previous literature, plant size is expected to matter
for compliance status, larger plants emit more pollution and are therefore more likely
to exceed their permitted amount of BOD. Plant size is measured as water outflow
from the plant.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the variable is expected to be exogenous to the model
because a plant’s size is often constant over a long period of time and therefore not
sensitive to temporary changes in other plants’ compliance status. Hence no reverse
causality is expected. Secondly, correlation with any of the omitted variables is not
likely since abatement technology, water price, local infrastructure and geographical
factors may vary across plant sizes. Plant size is more likely to be dependent on the
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the demand for water cleaning in the area where the plant is located, a parameter
which is not expected to aﬀect plants’ compliance behavior directly.
Time, Seasonality and State eﬀect From Section 4.1, we know that plant
inspections decline, whereas CSs increase, over the sample period 1990-2000. Thus,
controlling for time eﬀects is warranted. Inspections declined non-monotonically and
therefore time dummies are preferred over a linear time trend. Year dummies are
chosen over month dummies because enforcement, as well as the influential environ-
mental groups, have budgets according to fiscal year.
Streams carry more water in winter and spring which makes discharged pollution
more easily diluted during these seasons. Also, the amount of treated water may
vary with season. Seasonal dummies are included to account for these factors.
Public enforcement is formed, planned and implemented at the state level. State
dummies are included to allow for cross-state diﬀerences in enforcement activity.
Since some of the unobserved eﬀects occur at the plant level, one may wish
to include plant level dummies. Plant level dummies are however not included in
the study for two main reasons. Firstly, we want to control for enforcement and
enforcement is determined on the state level. Secondly, none of the instruments is
expected to correlate with the omitted variables. Together, this makes plant dummies
excessive. Furthermore, recalling that the variation in data is limited by few CSs,
plant dummies would reduce the variation even further, but without benefits.
4.4 Empirical model specification
The 2SLS-model consists of two parts: a first stage equation and a second stage
equation. In the first stage equation, the instruments are regressed on the endogenous
variable. The prediction of the endogenous variable is then included in the second
stage as an exogenous variable, together with the rest of the explanatory variables.
In this study, there are three first stage equations because there are three endogenous
variables. The standard IV-approach is to estimate the 2SLS-model in one step using
a preprogrammed method in econometric software such as Stata. If the sample sizes
between the first stage and the second stage diﬀer, the estimation is based on the
observations that are shared for the first and the second stage estimation. This is
unfortunate if the sample sizes diﬀer substantially between the estimations, since
valuable information will be lost in such cases. In the sample of this study, the first
stage estimations contain more observations than in the main model estimation (the
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second stage) does.30 Because citizen lawsuits are few, it’s preferable to keep as
much data as ever possible. Therefore, the 2SLS estimations are estimated manually
in two steps. Although this approach makes better use of the data, which leads us
closer to the true parameter values, the standard calculation of the second stage’s
standard errors are incorrect because it ignores the error that comes from using a
predicted, rather than an observed variable for estimation (the predicted rather than
observed endogenous variable). In an attempt to correct for the incorrect standard
errors, boot strapped standard errors are estimated in the second stages.31 As a
sensitivity check of the standard errors, the second stages are also estimated with
the simultaneous 2SLS estimation method. These results are discussed in Section
5.3 on sensitivity analysis, but are not part of the main results in Section 5.
4.4.1 IV-estimation methods: OLS, LPM and Probit
All first stages are estimated with OLS and robust standard errors. The second
stage regressions are estimated with three diﬀerent estimation methods: OLS, Lin-
ear Probability Model (LPM) and a Probit Model. The three estimation methods
are selected as the main estimation methods for this study. One may however con-
sider many more estimation methods, depending on the purpose of the estimation.
Although not presented in the main results, the count violation variable (number of
violations), will also be assessed in a count variable model, and a Logit model will
be estimated for comparison with the Probit estimation, as a robustness check.32
OLS In the OLS model, the dependent variable violations is a count variable: the
number of violations during the past 12 months, which makes the OLS model account
30There are more missing observations in the dependent variable in the second stage, than for
the dependent variables in the first stages. The second stage dependent variable isn’t needed in the
first stage estimation.
31Hsu et al (1986) show the eﬀectiveness of the bootstrap bias reduction method on 2SLS esti-
mates using Monte Carlo studies. The eﬀectiveness of boot strapped standard errors in IV-analyses
has since then been confirmed many times, for instance by Chau (2014).
32A Poisson model will be estimated and, in case of overdispersion, a Negative binomial regression
will also be estimated, and discussed in Section 5.3.1. In this study, the Probit model is used, but
also the Logit may be considered for the same estimation purposes. The Logit model has the
same properties as the Probit model, except for the underlying distribution, where the Probit has
a normal distribution and the Logit has a logistic distribution. The two models generate very
similar results, only the logistic has slightly flatter tails, i.e., the Probit curve approaches the axes
more quickly than the Logit curve. The Probit model is chosen due to the Probit estimation being
compatible with IV-estimation in pre-programmed softwares, which is used in the robustness check
in Section 5.3.1.
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for the additional eﬀect of being sued more than one time during the past 12 months.
The great benefit of the OLS model is its transparent estimation method and familiar
interpretation of the coeﬃcients as marginal eﬀects.
LPM Since most plants sued during the past 12 months are only sued once, the
violation variable is transformed into a binary variable in the next model to avoid bias
from extreme plants with many lawsuits. Using the same estimation procedure as
above on a binary dependent variable regression yields the LPM: a binary dependent
model of the probability of a ”successful” outcome, that is, Y=1 if the plant is in
violation of the law, Y=0 otherwise. In the LPM model, the parameter estimate of a
given variable is the change in the probability of success when changing that variable,
holding all other factors fixed. As for any LPMmodel, the dependent variable may be
predicted outside of the (0,1) range due to the underlying assumption of a Bernoulli
distribution, hence a binary response model is also warranted.
Probit The Probit model is also a binary dependent model which models the prob-
ability of a ”successful” outcome. But unlike LPM, which assumes strict linearity
between the parameters, the Probit model has a standard normal cumulative distri-
bution function which maps probabilities between 0 and 1. The distribution ensures
predicted probabilities to always be within the probability range 0–1. Unlike in the
LPM, the Probit coeﬃcients cannot directly be interpreted as the marginal eﬀect,
because the coeﬃcient is the partial eﬀect conditional on all other explanatory vari-
ables. The standard interpretation method is to evaluate the marginal eﬀect at the
mean. However, setting each independent variable to its mean does not guarantee
evaluation at the steepest part of the curve. In fact this only occurs if the dependent
variable has a success probability of approximately 50%. From Section 4.1, we know
that the variable violations is heavily skewed towards compliance, which makes this
evaluation method inappropriate. Instead the alternative method ”average marginal
eﬀects” will be estimated and interpreted.33 In terms of marginal eﬀects, the LPM
and Probit are largely equivalent and should give similar results.
4.4.2 2SLS equations
Now follow the specifications of the three first stages; one first stage for each instru-
mented variable: citizen lawsuits, plant inspections and fine amount.
33One may also evaluate marginal eﬀects at other percentiles. Due to space limitations, that will
not be included in this study, but a calculation of such marginal eﬀects are available upon request.
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First stage equations:
CSit = α0 +XitΠ+ Zitθ + ζit (2)
INit = β0 +XitΠ+ Zitθ + νit (3)
FIit = γ0 +XitΠ+ Zitθ + ηit (4)
where CSit is the number of citizen suits a plant has received during the past 12
months, INit is the number of inspections a plant has received by EPA (or state
agency) during the past 12 months and FIit is the magnitude of fines a plant has
been issued by EPA (or state agency) during the past 12 months. α0, β0 and γ0
are constants. The variable Z is the set of instrument,34 and X represents a vector
of all the additional explanatory variables discussed in Section 4.3. The subscripts
indicate plant i at time t. The errors terms ζit, νit and ηit are unique for each first
stage equation. The predicted dependent variables from the first stages are as a
second step included in the main equation as explanatory variables.
The second stage equations: In the second stage, the predicted new variables
obtained from Equations 2–4 are included in the second stage equation, Equation 5,
together with all the other explanatory variables.
V Iit = κ0 + CSitλ1 + INitλ2 + FIitλ3 +XitΩ+ ￿it, (5)
where V I is the violation variable and κ0 is a constant. Again, the subscripts indicate
plant i at time t. ￿ is an error term, estimated with boot strapped standard errors.
5 Empirical results
5.1 First stage determinants
Before presenting the main results from Equation 5, the determinants of the instru-
mented variables from Equation 2–4 are presented and discussed.
34The set of instrument used in a first stage is sometimes referred to as the ”Excluded instru-
ments”; the exogenous variables excluded from the main equation that are used as instruments for
the endogenous variables in the first stage.
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From the instruments, discussed in Section 4.3.3, three instrument sets are cre-
ated. They form two just-identified models and one overidentified model. A just-
identified model is a specification with as many instruments as endogenous variables,
whereas the overidentified model contains more instruments than endogenous vari-
ables. Because bias increases with the number of instruments, a just-identified model
has as little bias as possible. If the instruments are not weak, a just-identified model
is median-unbiased (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). An overidentified model on the
other hand may increase the explanation power of the instrumented variable, which
may lead to a more precise second stage estimation. Furthermore, an overidentified
model allows for testing of the exclusion restriction, although the test is not per-
fect. The overidentification test will be explained in section 5.3.2, together with a
discussion on the test results.
The three chosen sets of instruments, Model 1, 2 and 3, are presented in Table 3.
The top row shows the endogenous variables. The variables underneath are the
corresponding instruments which constitute the instrument sets for Models 1–3.
Table 3: The instruments used for citizen suits, EPA inspections and EPA fines,
respectively, in the three models considered.
Citizen lawsuits EPA inspections EPA fines
Instrument set in Model 1: GHP Tax Rate Income
Instrument set in Model 2: GHP EPA budget Income
Instrument set in Model 3: GHP and Caseload Tax Rate and EPA budget Income
The results from the first stage estimations are presented in Table 4. Each en-
dogenous variable is regressed on its instrument set and on all the other exogenous
variables from the main equation. The squared cells also help to indicate which in-
strument that constitutes the model. The coeﬃcients are OLS estimates with robust
standard errors.
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Table 4: First stage OLS results: Determinants of citizen suits, public monitoring
and enforcement regressions.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent variable
in the first stage:
Citizen
lawsuits
Inspections Fines Citizen
lawsuits
Inspections Fines Citizen
lawsuits
Inspections Fines
Instrument for
citizen lawsuits
GHP -0.03*** -0.55*** 9637.29*** -0.04*** -4.85*** -1.40** -0.03*** -6.35*** 9564.12***
(6.36) (19.44) (7.43) (7.18) (48.46) -1.40** (6.20) (48.55) (7.41)
Caseload – – – – – – -0.02*** 0.10 1531.07***
(Case per judge x 1000) (5.56) (1.63) (4.14)
Instrument for
inspections
Tax rate -0.000*** 0.002*** -0.000*** – – – -0.000*** 0.020*** -14.610**
(3.77) (19.01) (5.81) (3.55) (37.81) (2.29)
EPA budget – – – 0.000*** 0.003*** -3.041** -0.000 0.002*** 1.997***
(3.81) (4.09) (1.97) (0.56) (33.29) (2.96)
Instruments for
fines
Income 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.129*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.128*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.129***
(3.97) (8.21) (4.11) (3.83) (18.01) (4.15) (3.98) (18.71) (4.11)
Controls
Flow 0.000 0.001*** 60.71*** -0.000 0.008*** 60.75*** -0.000 0.008*** -0.080***
(0.85) (14.31) (5.97) (0.91) (32.97) (5.97) (0.86) (32.95) (0.17)
Other sanctions 0.000*** 0.000** 2.829*** 0.000*** -0.000 -2.784*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -2.751***
(12.13) (2.22) (3.18) (13.59) (0.41) (3.14) (11.80) (4.72) (3.14)
Other fines -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 60.724***
(3.90) (6.30) (5.58) (2.68) ( 7.46) (5.55) (3.65) (7.05)) (5.97)
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test of instruments 274.90 18.50 18.57 834.96 19.89 19.12 706.18 14.95 26.37
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nummer of observ. 105385 105385 105385 109988 109988 109988 105385 105385 105385
Adjusted R-squared 0.0084 0.0765 0.0171 0.0094 0.3603 0.0170 0.0087 0.3810 0.0171
Note: The first stage estimates are the first (out of two steps) in the 2SLS IV estimation.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% rejection levels, respectively.
The first thing to note is that all instruments have their expected signs, and that
all first stages’ intended instruments (the coeﬃcients within squares) are significant
at the 1%-rejection level. This indicates that the instruments work as intended.
One potential problem with any IV method is a weak performance by the first
stage; lower explanatory power in the first stage generates a less eﬃcient 2SLS esti-
mation. Here, the first-stage adjusted R-squareds vary between 0.0084 and 0.3810,
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where the former is considered as relatively weak and the latter as relatively strong,
in a 2SLS first stage context. The lowest (adjusted) R-squared values are found
in the regressions with CS as the dependent variable, and the strongest (adjusted)
R-squared are found for the regressions with inspections as the dependent variable.
Comparing the (adjusted) R squared for the just-identified models and the overiden-
tificated model indicates that adding more instruments doesn’t increase the explana-
tory power of the first stage estimation in this sample.
A rule of thumb in IV-analysis is that the instruments should have an F-statistic
of at least 10 in order to ensure that the maximum bias in the IV estimator is less
than 10% (Staiger and Stock, 1997). In this study, all F-statistics are larger than
10 and sometimes well beyond, see Table 4. Thus, despite low adjusted R-squared
values for some of the first stage regressions, the large F-test statistics suggest that
none of the instrument sets is weak, but rather strong.
5.2 Main results: second stage estimations
Here the main variable of interest is interpreted, the eﬀect of CSs on plant violations.
Also the eﬀect of public direct and indirect enforcement and the control variables are
interpreted. The first column in Table 5 contains all the explanatory variables. The
first row indicates which estimation method is used, and the second row indicates
which instrument set (forming Model 1–3) is used.
Table 5 shows a robust result for all variables across the three models (instrument
sets) as well as over the three estimation methods. Citizen suits have a strong
negative eﬀect on plant’s likelihood to be in violation, as well as a strong marginal
reduction eﬀect on violations. As expected, all public enforcement variables have a
negative impact on violations, the plant size variable is negative and the fixed eﬀects
dummies are jointly significant.35
35Joint significance (F-statistics) for fixed eﬀect dummy groups for Model 1–3, as well as all three
estimation methods, are available upon request.
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Table 5: Second stage regression results: the impact of citizen suits and public
enforcement on plant-level violations.
Dependent variable:
violation
OLS LPM Probit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Direct Deterrence
Instr. CS -14.31*** -9.59*** -6.24** -1.62** -4.85*** -1.40*** -1.58*** -5.19*** -1.43**
(-5.69) (-2.91) (3.95) (2.74) (4.20) (2.32) (2.34) (4.12) (2.64)
Instr. Inspections -0.999*** -0.100*** -0.127*** -0.191*** -0.024** -0.019*** - 0.205*** -0.026** -0.020***
(5.62) (2.83) (7.21) (3.36) (1.91) (3.82) (3.95) (1.95) (3.44)
Instr. Fines -0.497*** -0.632*** -0.632*** -0.009*** -0.005 -0.004*** - 0.010*** -0.008 -0.001***
(x 1000) (6.54) (8.32) (8.32) (2.70) (1.42) (8.32) (4.89) (1.08) (4.01)
Indirect deterrence
Recent sanctions -0.96 -3.31*** -3.31*** -0.85*** -0.12 -0.10*** -0.86*** -0.02 -0.10***
on others (x 1000) (0.99) (3.37) (3.35) (3.57) (0.34) (4.05) (3.51) (0.49) (3.35)
Recent fines -0.252*** -0.175** -0.235*** -0.03*** -0.001 -0.026** -0.04*** 0.0078 -0.035***
on others (x 1000000) (5.95) (5.81) (5.81) (2.70) (0.08) (2.44) (2.27) (0.78) (5.81)
Other controls
Flow 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.0000 0.001*** 0.004 0.0000 0.0006*** 0.0000
(4.53) (6.30) (6.30) (0.30) (4.09) (6.30) (0.44) (3.98) (0.17)
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yess
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nummer of observ. 97732 97732 97732 97732 97732 97732 97732 97732 97732
Note: T-statistics are shown in parentheses. For the Probit estimations, average marginal eﬀects
are presented in the table. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% rejection levels, respectively. The fixed eﬀect dummy coeﬃcients are not presented due
to space constraints. Each dummy group is jointly significant.
The magnitude of the variables vary over Model 1–3, suggesting that the choice
of instruments matter.36 Therefore, one should interpret the exact magnitudes of
the coeﬃcients with caution. Instead of focusing on a specific number, the estimate
36When fines are regressed on violations as a binary variable (LPM and Probit), fines become
insignificant in Model 2. In general, Model 2 generates more insignificant variables than the other
models do. The instrument that makes Model 2 unique compared to the Model 1 and 3, is the
EPA enforcement budget instrument. The instrument performs well in the first stages as well as
in the sensitivity analysis (disregarding the Sargan test, presented in Section 5.3.2), however the
instrument is more aggregated than any other instruments in this study (U.S. federal level and
yearly). Reducing the variation in the dependent variable increases the risk for perfect prediction
as well as insignificant coeﬃcients, which is likely to be the explanation why Model 2 drops in
significance in the LMP and the Probit estimations.
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ranges within an estimation method are discussed here. The OLS estimations suggest
that, a plant that has been sued by a private citizen during the past 12 months
is expected to violate the law 6.24 to 14.31 times less than it otherwise would.
Correspondingly, the LPM models suggest that the marginal probability to violate
the CWA decreases by 140–485%. The average marginal eﬀect estimated with the
Probit model shows that one citizen suit is expected to decrease the number of
violations by 1.43–5.19 violations. In the OLS and Probit estimates, Models 1 and 2
are significant at the 1%-rejection level and Model 3 at the 5%-rejection level, while
in the LPM estimate, it is Model 1 which is significant at the 5%-rejection level and
the other two at the 1%-rejection level. The marginal eﬀects estimated with LPM
and Probit are very similar for Model 1–3, as expected.
All OLS marginal eﬀects are larger for Model 1–3, compared to the estimates
in the LPM and the Probit estimations. The OLS estimate is the only method in
which violations in the last 12 months is represented by a count variable (and not a
binary). It is indeed expected that the marginal eﬀects of the explanatory variables
is more easily discernible once a trend in number of violations is allowed in the data.
In general, Model 2 is less significant in the limited response model.
The eﬀect of CSs is considerably larger than for the public enforcement vari-
ables.37 Both sanctions of other plants and the magnitude of the fines other plants
have to pay when found in violation, significantly reduce the likelihood of violations.
The finding confirms previous research that an indirect deterrence eﬀect exists, how-
ever the eﬀect found in this study is smaller than previously research suggests.38 All
public enforcement (direct as well as indirect) variables are shown to be somewhat
less strong than suggested in previous studies.39 Because plants that are often in
37Compare the marginal eﬀect: 6.24 to 14.31 violations/citizen suits and 0.10 to 0.999 viola-
tions/EPA inspection. The LPM model suggests a plant inspection during the past 12 months
reduces the probability of a violation by 2-19%. The violation marginal reduction per $1000 fine
is 0.497 to 0.632 in the OLS estimations. Increasing the fine by $1000 yields a violation likelihood
reduction of 0.9% in Model 1, and 0.4% in Model 3, both significant at the 1%-rejection level in
the LPM estimations.
38Gray and Shadbegian (2007) find that direct and indirect enforcement have about the same
deterrence eﬀect for a given plant, and that fines have the largest deterrence eﬀect. This study
indicates however that direct enforcement has considerably larger impact on plant violations than
indirect enforcement.
39Magat and Viscusi (1990) find that a given facilitys probability to violate the law is about twice
as high if the facility has not been inspected in the previous quarter, whereas this study finds a
likelihood reduction of 19% at most, if the plant has been inspected during the past 12 months.
The diﬀerence may partly be explained by the diﬀerent time intervals investigated; it’s reasonable
for the eﬀect of an inspection to be stronger closer to the inspection date. But also Deily and Gray
(2007) find a strong deterrence eﬀect of plant inspections: they find that the probability that a
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violation are at risk of being sued by a private citizen, ignoring CSs will most likely
bias the estimated eﬀect of public enforcement upwards.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
5.3.1 Model specification
The estimated results suggest that citizen suits have a strong negative eﬀect on
plant violations, and an eﬀect of public enforcement in line with previous literature
is found. This section will examine the robustness of the results.
In an attempt to rectify for incorrect standard errors in the two-step 2SLS ap-
proach, boot-strapped standard errors are used in the second stage estimations. Al-
though this remedy is supported in the literature and is shown to be asymptotically
unbiased, the sample is not infinitely large and incorrect standard errors may be
present. Therefore, the one-step (OLS) 2SLS approach is estimated as a robustness
check. The standard errors in the two-step estimation are allowed to show some
deviations from the one-step estimation due to the diﬀerent sample sizes assessed.
The one-step estimations show slightly lower significance than obtained with the
boot-strapped standard errors shown in Table 5 for Model 1–2. The CS variable
is insignificant in the third model using the one-step approach.40 This diﬀerence
may be an indication of incorrect standard errors but may also be explained by the
reduced data sample, which the variable CS is especially sensitive to.
As a robustness check of the choice of estimation methods, two additional models
are estimated: the Logit model, in order to compare the results from the probit
estimations, and a count model as a complement to the OLS estimates, for which
the dependent variable is a count variable. Estimating the models with Logit gives
similar results as with the Probit model presented in Table 5.41 Estimating the
models with Poisson estimation indicates overdispersion and therefore a Negative
Binomial (NB)-regression is estimated.42 The result shows no major diﬀerences in
plant would comply with the environmental law is about 33% higher if the plant has been inspected
during the past two years. That is a longer period of time investigated compared to this study, still
the estimated deterrence eﬀect is larger.
40CS has a marginal deterrence eﬀect of –7.77 and is significant on the 5% rejection level in
Model 1. In Model 2, the marginal eﬀect of CSs is –8.72 and is significant on the 10% rejection
level.
41In the Logit estimation (with boot-strapped errors), CS has an average marginal eﬀect of -1.51
in Model 1, -5.09 in Model 2, and -1.32 in Model 3, significant at the 5% rejection-level in Model 1
and 3, and at the 1%-rejection level in Model 2.
42Overdispersion refers to greater variability (statistical dispersion) than the expected mean in a
given data sample. Under such circumstances, the Negative Binomial NB-regression is preferable
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significance compared to the OLS estimates.43
As a final robustness check, the time dummies are replaced by time trends in case
month trends exist in the data. The results with time trend are consistent with the
results in Table 5 (only some coeﬃcients are larger in magnitude), suggesting that
year dummies are warranted.
5.3.2 Potential violations of the exclusion restriction
As previously mentioned, exogeneity of the instruments cannot be tested. With an
overidentificated model, it’s however possible to conduct an overidentification test,
among which, the ”Sargan test” is standard. It exploits that the coeﬃcients should
not diﬀer significantly when they are regressed separately on the endogenous vari-
able.44 The test is however not perfect, since it’s impossible to estimate unobserved
eﬀects in practice. In this study, Model 3 is an overidentified model.
The null hypothesis of exogenous instruments is rejected on the 1% rejection
level,45 suggesting that we cannot reject the possibility that one or more instruments
are endogenous to the model. It is possible that plants are aﬀected by the general
local demand for a clean environment. If they are, then the GDP per income vari-
able and the state income tax variable, which are both believed to increase with
people’s demand for a cleaner environment, may be correlated with omitted factors
that determine plant pollutions and, in turn, violations of the CWA. These scenarios
assume that plants are sensitive to the local demand for a certain level of clean envi-
ronment. However, according to Becker (1968), as well as the empirical findings on
plant compliance, plants are not sensitive to private enforcement without penalties.
Furthermore, if the state income tax is correlated with the state corporation
tax level, and the corporation tax aﬀects the plant’s profitability which in turn
aﬀects the choice of abatement technology — which is expected to be a relevant
omitted variable for plant violations — then state income tax would fail the exclusion
over the Poisson regression. The likelihood test is chi-square distributed and has a chi-square test
statistic of 6.8 · 104, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.000.
43In the NB-reg estimation, the CS variable have the following coeﬃcients –29.03, –7.11 and
–16.55, for Model 1–3 respectively. All estimates are significant on the 1%-rejection level.
44Since the 2SLS is estimated manually in two steps in this study, also the Sargan test (which
is predefined in most econometric software) has to be computed manually. It is calculated by first
estimating the second stage equation and obtaining the 2SLS residuals. The R-squared obtained
from this regressions is multiplied by the number of observations and is chi-square distributed;
nR2 ∼ χ2q. Under the null hypothesis, all residuals are uncorrelated with the instruments. If the
null is rejected, the test suggests that at least one of the instruments fail the exclusion restriction.
For a full description of the test method, see Sargan (1958).
45For all three estimation methods, the Sargan χ2 is 9.77 and Prob > χ2is 0.008***.
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restriction. This assumes that profitability would determine abatement technology
and not, as we would expect according to the literature, the net gain of implementing
the technology.
IV estimations with slight violations of the exogeneity assumption can cause se-
vere bias in IV coeﬃcients. The bias is amplified if the instruments are weak (Bound,
Jaeger, and Baker, 1995). Therefore it’s important to remember that bias may be
present, yet presumably small, when interpreting the coeﬃcients in Table 5. Note-
worthily, the Sargan test is an imperfect test and the possible bias is not aggravated,
since the instruments are strong.
6 Conclusions
By investigating citizen suits as a possible determinant of plants’ compliance behavior
in a 10 year monthly panel data set, together with public enforcement variables, this
study aims to answer two questions.
The first aim of this study was to investigate whether plants change their behavior
after they have been sued in a federal district court by private citizen. The empirical
results suggest that this is indeed the case. Plants that have experienced a private
citizen suit during the past 12 months, are five times less likely to be in violation
with the CWA. Although citizen lawsuits are relatively few compared to inspections
and sanctions by EPA, the marginal deterrence eﬀect of a CS is large and is likely
to be the explanation to the seemingly irrational behavior among plants to comply
under weak incentives. In fact, the perceived cost of non-compliance may never have
been reduced when public enforcement started to decrease in the 1990s, since CSs
started to increase during the same time. This study oﬀers one explanation: that
the incentives in fact might be higher than anticipated, given the possibility of a CS.
The second aim of this study, was to compare plants’ behavior change after they
have been sued by a private citizen, to the plant behavior change after they have
received public enforcement. In line with previous literature, public enforcement is
shown to have both a direct and indirect deterrence eﬀect on violating the CWA,
however the probability reduction for a plant to be in violation of the CWA after
a citizen suit is substantially larger compared to when a plant has been subject to
public enforcement. Furthermore, by acknowledging the eﬀect of CSs, this study
suggests that the deterrence eﬀect of EPA inspections and the marginal eﬀect of
EPA fines are smaller than previously found.
In order to capture the causal eﬀect of citizen suits on violations, this study takes
a (fixed eﬀects 2SLS) IV-approach, with in total five instruments. The result is
robust to three diﬀerent IV estimation methods (OLS, LPM and Probit) and three
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diﬀerent sets of instruments. Citizen suits are instrumented with judicial instruments
recognized in previous literature, exploiting that all citizen suits have to go through
a federal district court. Public enforcement are instrumented with EPA’s enforce-
ment budget and two instruments capturing the public demand for enforcement of
environmental regulation. The three instruments for direct public enforcement have
never been used before, and are a contribution of this study. All instruments behave
as expected and show strong first stages. Furthermore, all instrumented variables
behave as expected.
The large deterrence eﬀects of CSs is a remarkable result in magnitude and sig-
nificance. Although the eﬀect of a CS was expected to be larger than for public
enforcement, a five-time reduction in the likelihood to violate the CWA after a CS
during the past 12 months, is a very strong deterrence eﬀect. This result opens up
for possibilities, how should this information be transformed to policy recommenda-
tions?
Already in 1985, Fadil (1985) argues for the potential of CSs, and how CSs can
be a solution when public enforcement is lacking and no prospects of increased en-
forcement budget is in sight. Pollution and lacking environmental law enforcement,
are however problems facing more countries than the U.S., where this study is con-
ducted. Furthermore, since a government may not always act in the public’s interest,
the possibility for the people to pursue a lawsuit may be important from a demo-
cratic point of view.46 It might thus seem natural to suggest adapting a system for
CSs to other contexts.
Recalling the unique features of CSs, compared to public enforcement, that CSs
are: unpredictable, very costly for the plant, and crowding in public monitoring, call
for some thought whether CSs are desired to take a larger part in a society, before a
promotion of its large marginal eﬀect. EPA’s enforcement objective is to push non-
compliance plants into compliance. Private enforcers on the other hand, will claim
for the largest possible fine. Therefore, CSs may lead to market distortions. Also,
private enforcers may choose plants arbitrarily, as well as making mountains out of
molehills. If plants would be subject to more private enforcement, plants would have
to spend substantial time and money in defense, an ineﬃciency which would lead to
additional market distortions.
As opposed to the U.S., Sweden has chosen the ”ombudsman” way to go in order
46The empirical results found in this study may theoretically be generalized to other environ-
mental laws in the U.S., although water violations are easier to prove for an environmental group
than for instance air pollution violations, owing to quick dissolution with large quantities of air.
The results may also be generalized as a possible outcome for other countries, given that they have
strong environmental groups, or other powerful agents, that are able to prosecute against violators.
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to take charge of private interests to enforce the environmental laws. Instead of
bringing a citizen suit directly towards the polluter, the private citizen turns to the
ombudsman to make a complaint, and then the ombudsman prosecutes against the
violator. To assess which way is better, more democratic and more economically
eﬃcient, more studies have to be done on the eﬀects of citizen suits. This study has
contributed one new piece to the puzzle – a citizen lawsuit directed towards a plant
in violation is found to have a large direct deterrence eﬀect on future violation. But
what about the perceived marginal cost of CSs’ existence? What are the indirect
deterrence eﬀects of CSs? This study shows the potential in further exploring the
impact of citizen suits.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Sources
Table 6: Data sources
Variables included in
the data analysis:
Data source:
Citizen suits, GHP score,
case load of judges
Langpap and Shimshack, 2010
(US Department of Justice)
Plant inspections, monetary fines,
violations, plant size
Langpap and Shimshack, 2010
(EPAs Permit Compliance System)
Income per capita Bureau of Economic Analysis
State-local tax burden on
private income
Census Bureau’s data base providing
historical statistics on State Tax Collections
EPA enforcement budget EPA’s webpage, see historical data
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